Challenges and Opportunities Posed by the Reform Era. by Courtney, Mark E.
Challenges and Opportunities
Posed by the Reform Era
Mark E. Courtney, M.S.W., Ph.D.
University of Wisconsin-Madison
February 26, 1999
Presented at the “Reconciling Welfare Reform With Child Welfare” Conference, sponsored by
the Center for Advanced Studies in Child Welfare, School of Social Work, and Center for Urban
and Regional Affairs, University of Minnesota.
Introduction
In the eyes of the public and policy makers we are now in the midst of the era of welfare reform.
We have clearly ended welfare as we knew it and have embarked on a course of wide-ranging
experimentation with the nation’s economic safety net for children and families.  What is less
obvious, however, both to the public and most policy makers, is that we are also in the midst of
an era of the most profound child welfare services reform in at least 20 years.  My primary
purpose today is to argue that the architects of welfare and child welfare reform, at all levels of
government, must design these reforms collaboratively if they are to achieve the greatest benefit
for children and families.
I will be presenting a national perspective on this issue today.  This is for two reasons.
First, out of necessity, since I make no claim to having any meaningful knowledge of
Minnesota’s efforts to implement welfare or child welfare reform.  Second, because I see this as
a time of wide-ranging experimentation at the state and local level regarding both welfare and
child and family services.  In such a context, I believe that it is wise to go beyond what is ready
at hand when contemplating what is possible.  In short, an open mind is a good idea these days
more than ever.  My comments also assume a basic knowledge on your part of welfare reform
and national child welfare policy and funding.
In the next twenty minutes or so I will briefly outline the elements of the federal welfare
reform legislation and the most important child welfare reforms currently being implemented.  I
will identify some common themes that emerge from the child welfare reforms in particular.  I
will then turn to a brief discussion of why child welfare and workfare authorities should design
their new systems collaboratively.  I will identify some unique challenges, and opportunities,
posed by the reform era.  Finally I will present a sketch of my vision of where welfare and child
welfare reform ought to be going.  I believe these to be very complex issues that require more
time than I have today to discuss adequately, but I hope to at least identify some central issues
for discussion.
Welfare Reform
What, in general terms, is meant by welfare reform?  In August 1996, President Clinton signed
into law P.L. 104-193.  The law converted AFDC, Emergency Assistance (incidentally, a
program previously used to fund family preservation services in many states), and the Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills training program into the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) block grant in the form of a single capped entitlement to states at an estimated
funding level of $16.5 billion through 2002. A few elements of the law are most relevant to my
presentation.  There is no longer a federal entitlement to basic cash assistance to families in need.
With few exceptions, the assistance that states choose to make available, other than Food Stamps
and Medicaid, is tied to parental work effort.  Federal reimbursement under TANF for state aid is
time limited with most states choosing much shorter time limits than those allowed under federal
law.  The childcare funding provided under the law is inadequate in the long-term if states are
able to meet the work participation goals in the law.  Lastly, major sources of federal funding for
child welfare services are either eliminated through collapsing them into TANF (i.e., Emergency
Assistance) or cut (i.e., the Title XX Social Services Block Grant).
At the most basic level, PRWORA emphasizes a parent’s responsibility to work.  It
represents the final transformation of a program intended to support low-income adults’  ab lity
to parent heir children, Aid to Dependent Children, into a program intended to provide limited
support for low-income parents to work.  AFDC was ultimately a child welfare program, albeit a
deeply flawed one.  TANF is a workfare program.  Its enacting legislation scarcely mentions
parenting.
Child Welfare Reform
What is the nature of recent child welfare reforms?  I will focus on selected changes in federal
policy that I believe to be the most significant, though my list is by no means exhaustive.  First
and foremost is the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.  Although the law contains a
number of elements, the most significant ones can be grouped into the following categories.
ASFA
First, ASFA makes clear that child safety should be the paramount concern of the child
welfare system, both in terms of decisions to remove a child from home, and to return a child to
the care of his or her family.  This is manifest in changes to the wording of Title IV-B
requirements for state child welfare services plans and case plans and in the restrictions on the
conditions under which reasonable efforts must be made to preserve families and engage in
family reunification.  Second, ASFA emphasizes moving children more quickly toward
permanence than under current law through a number of mechanisms.  These include a very
short time frame (30 days) for permanency plan hearings when the determination is made that
reasonable efforts do not need to be made toward family reunification, a shortening from 18 to
12 months of the deadline for a permanency plan hearing in all other cases, encouragement of
concurrent planning, and the requirement, with some exceptions, that child welfare agencies file
a petition to terminate a parent’s rights whenever a child has been in out-of-home care for at least
15 of the past 22 months.  One notable exception to the TPR provisions of ASFA is that such
petitions need not be filed when a child is living with a relative.  Third, ASFA provides explicit
support for increasing and supporting adoption by creating adoption incentive payments to the
states, expanding health coverage for adopted children with special needs through Medicaid,
continuing Title IV-E eligibility for dissolved adoptions, and eliminating geographic barriers to
adoption.  Fourth, ASFA continues funding for part 2 of Title IV-B, formerly the Family
Preservation and Support program, by renaming it the Promoting Safe and Stable Families
Program and allowing the funds to be used for time-limited family reunification and adoption
support and preservation efforts.  Lastly, ASFA attempts to improve accountability for child
welfare services by giving relatives, foster parents, and pre-adoptive parents the right to be heard
in review hearings, requiring states to establish quality standards for foster care, expanding the
Title IV-E waiver program to allow for more state experimentation, and establishing outcome
measures to assess state’s performance in their management of Title IV-B and IV-E programs.
ASFA is a hodgepodge of policy initiatives, but certain themes are apparent.  First, the
backlash against family preservation clearly had its effect in Washington.  The new message is
that parents should be given a shorter period of time to get their act together and that the system
must move more quickly to create permanent living situations for children.  Second, adoption is
clearly in favor in Washington.  This is also manifest in the President’s adoption initiatives.
Lastly, the relative stability of child welfare policy over the past twenty years has come to an end
and ASFA most likely does not represent a new paradigm in the way that the Adoption and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-272) did.1  The proliferation of Title IV-E waivers, continuing
interest in child welfare fiscal reform at the federal level (i.e., block grants), and the development
of performance standards for states, foreshadows more change in the future in federal child
welfare policy.
MEPA
In addition to ASFA, the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act and its amendments are also
important elements of current child welfare policy and represent a considerable shift from child
welfare practice over the past two decades or so in which race and culture were considered
important factors to take into account when making placement decisions.  MEPA states that race,
ethnicity and national origin may not be used in child welfare practice to either delay or deny a
child’s foster care or adoptive placement, or the opportunity of any person to become a foster or
adoptive parent. In fact, states can lose part of their Title IV-E foster care funding if the federal
government determines that this provision of MEPA has been violated.  In addition, MEPA
                                                 
1P.L. 96-272 ushered in the era of "permanency planning," calling for prompt and decisive action
to maintain children in their own homes or place them, as quickly as possible, in permanent
homes with other families, preferably through guardianship or adoption.  The law also created
financial incentives for the states to pursue permanency for children (e.g., adoption subsidies)
and threatened withdrawal of federal funding if states did not carry out the law’s procedural
protections for children and families.  This was a radical shift from the previously laissez faire
federal policy regarding how state and local child welfare agencies should serve children and
families.  In contrast, although ASFA emphasizes certain aspects of existing child welfare policy
(child protection) over others (family preservation), it does not represent a sea change in the way
that P.L. 96-272 did.
allows individuals to sue under federal civil rights law if they believe that race or ethnicity has
been used to deny a child or parent their rights under MEPA.  MEPA also calls for diligent
recruitment of foster and adoptive parents who reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of children
in the community for whom foster and adoptive placements are needed.
Thus, interestingly, MEPA is explicitly color-blind at the individuallevel in its
prohibition against using race in making placements but recognizes the importance of race and
ethnicity at the community level.  The latter consideration is no doubt due to the child welfare
system’s chronic inability to attract and retain foster and adoptive parents from communities of
color.  Still, from my perspective it is telling that the color-blind elements of MEPA are enforced
through the explicit threat of federal financial sanctions and civil rights lawsuits, whereas it is
unclear what consequences, if any, states face for failure to engage in diligent foster and adoptive
parent recruitment in communities of color.  At any rate, it should be clear that those interested
in the culture wars over race in America have found in the child welfare system another place to
wage their battles.
Title IV-E Waivers
The waivers granted of regulations governing the expenditure of Title IV-E funds to
states in recent years provide a glimpse of the future of child welfare policy and practice.  States
have been given waivers to conduct a number of demonstration projects using IV-E dollars.
Although there are a wide range of demonstrations, I will focus on three trends that are already
apparent based on the first 18 states to obtain waivers.  One of the most popular uses of the
waivers is the creation of subsidized guardianship programs for children living in kinship foster
care.  The idea is to end child welfare and court supervision of kinship care arrangements while
facilitating the continuation of financial assistance that foster care maintenance payments have
provided to the kin caregiver.  These experiments attempt to address the rapid growth of kinship
foster care nationally and the fact that many children placed with kin appear to be staying in the
system indefinitely.
Several states have also engaged in various types of system reform all of which rely to
some extent on fiscal incentives to counties or regions of a state.  These projects emphasize the
need to be more flexible in funding and service delivery.  A major element of several of these
projects is the use of capitated payment strategies and other aspects of managed care.  Thus,
while there is an emphasis on reform present in several of the waiver programs, there is also a
heavy emphasis on the idea that changing the way child welfare services are administered can
help contain costs.
Related to the system reform waiver demonstrations are a few others that seek to provide
intensive so-called wrap-around services using IV-E funds.  The intent of these programs is
either to prevent out-of-home placement altogether for identified families or to reduce the need
for institutional care of children already in out-of-home care.  Both of these goals would
presumably reduce costs.
It is too early to tell which if any of these demonstrations will succeed, but it seems to me
that three major themes emerge from the waiver demonstrations so far.  First, states recognize
that the growth of long-term state-supported kinship care raises serious issues for the child
welfare system, issues that are difficult to resolve given current funding mechanisms and policy.
I will point out shortly how welfare reform only raises the ante even more when it comes to
questions of how best to structure state-supported kinship care.  Second, states are very interested
in containing the costs of the child welfare system and believe that they can do so by using funds
more flexibly, more intensively, and by employing the cost control mechanisms of managed care
and privatization.  The states are not alone in their concern about the costs of child welfare
services.  The Urban Institute’s recently released report on government child welfare
expenditures concluded that $14.4 billion is a conservative estimate of total expenditures on
child welfare programs by federal, state, and local government in 1996.  Federal expenditures
were around $6.5 billion in that year.  To put that in perspective, the federal government now
spends more on child welfare services than it does on Title 1, the school breakfast and lunch
programs, WIC, child care, and Head Start.
Why Do Things Any Differently?
So, there is no question that this is a period of rapid change in public assistance and child welfare
services programs, though one could argue that “reform” of child welfare services is still more at
the policy level than at the practice level.  Still, does the simple fact that these changes are taking
place at the same time necessarily imply that they should be coordinated efforts?  Why should
child welfare and public assistance authorities design their reforms in collaboration?  After all, it
is not as if these folks have worked closely together in the past.  For example, although they were
undoubtedly interested, it is hard to believe that federal child welfare authorities had much to do
with the design of TANF!  One can make similar observations about front-line practice.  As an
administrator of one of the for-profit welfare reform operations in Milwaukee recently observed
based on his experience as a child welfare worker, in the past, about the only interaction between
the two systems was when a child welfare worker asked an AFDC eligibility worker to cut off a
parent’s check so that they could find the parent.  This is probably an overstatement, but it
illustrates the point.  Another welfare manager recently pointed out to me that he thought that we
had ended this debate back in the 1970s when we separated public assistance from social
services.
Regardless of the sentiments of current administrators, I believe that there are at le st two
very good reasons for asking the two systems to work together, indeed even to function as one
system for many intents and purposes.  First, the undeniable relationship between family poverty,
child abuse and neglect, and involvement in the child welfare system demands that changes in
either system take into account the purpose and functioning of the other.  A few figures should
help to support this point.  Most obvious is the fact that over half of all children in out-of-home
care come from Title IV-E eligible (i.e., AFDC eligible) families and that approximately 90
percent are Medicaid eligible.  The most recent National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and
Neglect (NIS-3) found that children from families with incomes below $15,000 per year were 22
times more likely to be subjected to child maltreatment than children from families with incomes
over $30,000 per year (still below the median household income).  Lastly, though there are
almost no data from welfare waiver demonstrations on child welfare outcomes for children in
effected families, the limited evidence is troubling.  For example, a study in Illinois found that
families who received financial sanctions due to non-compliance with work rules and other
requirements of the workfare waiver in that state were 53 percent more likely in the ensuing year
to become an open child welfare case and over 104 percent more likely to have a child placed in
out-of-home care.
Second, the populations served by the workfare and child welfare systems are rapidly
becoming one in the same.  Poverty is not the only thing that the two populations have in
common.  As cash assistance caseloads plummet around the country, there is growing
recognition that the residual caseload is made up largely of families with parents who have
serious obstacles to succeeding in the workforce.  These obstacles include parental mental
illness, substance abuse, domestic violence, and limited education.  With the possible exception
of limited education, these are exactly the kinds of issues that parents bring with them to the
child welfare system.  Put simply, for the most part the challenges that limit the ability of many
parents to parent effectively also limit their ability to hold down any job, let alone a family-
supporting job.  This is not to say that all parents who apply for work-based welfare are child
abusers, only that the kinds of services that are needed to help both populations are beginning to
look very much the same.  Moreover, workfare offices, like it or not, are rapidly becoming social
services offices as program administrators come to terms with the needs of their clients.
The bottom line is that when you “reform” the public assistance system, you alter
something that the vast majority of families involved with the child welfare system rely on.  At
the same time, the demands imposed on parents by the child welfare system (e.g., court
appearances, workday meetings with child welfare workers and treatment providers, etc.) can get
in the way of parents’ ability to work, ostensibly the goal of the new welfare system.  I believe
that we simply do not have the luxury anymore of acting as if the two systems are only
peripherally related.  Whatever its limitations, the previous public assistance system
complemented the child welfare services system: It provided minimal financial support to poor
families regardless of whether or not parents chose or were able to work.  This is no longer the
case.
Challenges
Let me describe some of the potential problems posed by the current configuration of welfare
and child welfare reforms.  I should preface these examples by admitting that they primarily
illustrate challenges for the child welfare system rather than for the workfare system.  This is
because the managers of the new welfare system can largely ignore the consequences of their
policies and practices for the child welfare system, at least for the time being, since the success
of welfare reform is being judged largely in terms of caseload reduction.  As a result, workfare
administrators can ignore broader issues of parental and child well-being.  I believe that this is
largely the reason for the current “hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil” attitude of the
architects and administrators of welfare reform when it comes to the child welfare system.
The most obvious problem welfare reform presents for the child welfare system is the
potential increase in demand for services that will likely result if many families cannot cope with
the demand to obtain steady employment. The increase in demand that might result from greater
familial poverty and other stress on families is far greater than the decrease in demand that could
result from improvement in the economic circumstances of poor families.  This is for a very
simple reason: The financial benefits of work are likely to be marginal for most families that
enter the workforce as a result of reform.  Studies of families involved in welfare-to-work
programs and those who “voluntarily” leave welfare show that relatively few experience
substantial improvements in their economic well-being.2  If th  economic benefits of reform for
families are likely to be limited, the economic consequences of program sanctions for affected
                                                 
2  See, for example, Daniel R. Meyer and Maria Cancian, “Life after Welfare,” Public Welfare
(Fall 1996, pp. 25-29);  The JOBS Evaluation, Early Findings on Program Impacts in Three
Sites (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department
of Education, 1995); James Riccio, Daniel Friedlander, and Stephen Freedman, GAIN: Benefits,
Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work Program (New York: Manpower
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families may be devastating.  It largely remains to be seen how parents who receive financial
sanctions due to program noncompliance will fare.  Similarly, we have yet to witness large-scale
dropping of families from assistance due to time limits.  To the extent that the impact of welfare
reform on the child welfare system has been discussed at all it is almost always discussed in
these terms: Will enough families be harmed enough by welfare reform to significantly increase
demand for child welfare services?
Child welfare reform only complicates matters even more.  For example, shortening
permanency planning deadlines and speeding TPR decisions at a time when communities have to
gear up for moving virtually the entire population of low-income families with children into the
labor force is not a trivial pursuit. As I have already mentioned, many of the parents in these
families have chronic problems that will need to be addressed if parents are to succeed in
obtaining steady work.  Yet the new permanency deadlines do not acknowledge the chronicity of
substance abuse, mental illness, and domestic violence.  For example, most people who recover
from a substance abuse problem have at least one significant relapse on the way to recovery, but
poor parents in the reform era may not have that luxury if they are to keep their children.
Given the color-blind ethos behind MEPA, it is ironic that the impact of the new ASFA
time frames is most likely to affect children of color, particularly African American children.
Children of color not only enter the child welfare system in disproportionate numbers, they tend
to stay in care much longer as well.  Thus, the children being brought into court as a result of
mandated TPR petition hearings are disproportionately likely to be children of color.  This will
only be compounded by the fact that residual welfare caseloads are increasingly made up of
families of color (now a majority of all cases nationally), as white families appear to have had
more luck in gaining entry to the work force.  Hopefully the forces behind MEPA were correct in
their assumption that the main reason children of color remain in foster care is that race-
matching placement policies of child welfare agencies have kept a host of white families from
adopting children of color.  I have my doubts.
But increased demand for services is not the only potentia  problem caused by
simultaneous welfare and child welfare reform. What about the tendency of one system to try to
circumscribe its responsibility for helping children and families, often at the expense of the other
system?  For example, some states and localities have defined failure to succeed at meeting
required workfare requirements as constituting de facto evidence of child neglect.  This clearly
complicates things for child welfare agencies.  Alternatively, some child welfare agencies hope
to simply define away the problem of increased neglect reports due to welfare reform by
adhering to a rigid interpretation of the idea that "poverty-related" neglect does not constitute
child maltreatment.  Needless to say, this is not likely to please many mandated reporters who
already feel that the system fails to protect children in dire circumstances.
TANF and child welfare agencies will almost certainly turn to kinship care as a way to
find homes for children who are displaced by welfare reform.  What will be interesting to watch
is how they choose to do this.  Will it take the form of expanded use of Title IV-E foster care
funding of kinship care within the legal framework of the child welfare system, with all of the
legal and fiscal challenges that entails?  One attraction of this approach is the fact that, unlike
TANF, Title IV-E imposes no time limit or work requirements on financial support of relative
caregivers.  Alternatively, will states increasingly rely on thinly veiled threats of child removal to
convince extended family members to find a home for endangered children without government
financial assistance or other services?  Wisconsin has already created a hybrid kinship care
program that pays kin to care for children “at risk” of coming under the protection of the child
welfare system, neatly avoiding the need to provide family or child welfare services.  It would
certainly be nice if policy makers and program administrators could devise a way of supporting
the important role of relative caregiving that meets the needs of both the child welfare and
workfare systems.
Perhaps the least obvious problem caused by the haphazard coordination of welfare and
child welfare reform is the fact that it is likely to lead to further needless fragmentation of social
services.  TANF agencies need access to substance abuse services, mental health services, and
services to women living with violent partners so as to enable parents to work.  Child welfare
agencies need access to precisely the same kinds of services, but for a different purpose: They
want to help parents to be better parents.  In the absence of a firm commitment on the part of the
service provider to helping parents to achieve both goals, it is far too easy to focus on one at the
expense of the other.  This is particularly true when the agency paying for the service (i.e., either
the TANF of child welfare agency) has only one goal in mind.  So-called child welfare system
reform, wrap-around, and managed care initiatives undertaken in isolation from welfare reform
appear almost laughable when viewed from this perspective.
Opportunities
Let's assume for the moment that I have convinced you, or you were already convinced, that the
two systems should be working closely together.  What would this look like?  What are the
opportunities presented by the reform era?
First and foremost, I believe that actively struggling with welfare reform and child
welfare brings us face to face with the need to create an integrated system of supports, both
formal and informal, to ensure that families have the best chance to balance the demands, and
achieve the rewards, of work and parenting.  There appears to be a broad political consensus that
work must be part of the social contract between families and society.  This is not to say that
there is no room for a better acknowledgment of parenting as important work with significant
benefits to society, particularly during the first year or so of a child’s life.  Nevertheless, we
simply are not going to return anytime soon to a system of cash assistance that is not firmly tied
to work, or activities directed at preparing parents for work.
Ironically, the explicit recognition that moving low-income parents into the work force
will require subsidized child care, health care, and other supports raises the question as to why
these supports are not available to all working poor families, or, for that matter, all working
families.  The reform era offers the possibility of a broad political coalition in support of
universal family supports, something that was less conceivable as long as the working poor could
be taught to see AFDC recipients as "them."  Now virtually all poor families are working poor
families, they are a much larger "us."
At a practical level, workfare administrators and workers must begin to see parenting as
an essential task of working parents, one that cannot simply take a back seat to work.  This will
involve more attention on the part of workfare personnel to the implications for parenting of the
demands they put on parents.  Similarly, child welfare administrators and workers must learn to
accept that parents have no choice but to balance the demands of their job with the demands of
the court and the case plan.  Failure to do so nowadays can easily result in homelessness,
something that makes family preservation and reunification very difficult.   In some cases, it may
be possible to initiate these changes in philosophy and practice from the bottom up in both
systems.  However, real change is likely to require leadership from the top both due to funding
issues and attitudinal inertia in both systems.  Indeed, collaborative efforts will be difficult to
accomplish if the political leadership actively denies the relationship between welfare reform and
child welfare, a common position these days.
New service delivery models are likely to emerge in places where the two systems begin
to work together.  In particular, substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence service
providers will need to develop intervention strategies that acknowledge the complex and often
competing demands of parenting and work.  Collaborative planning of managed care initiatives
by child welfare and workfare authorities could lead to some cutting-edge approaches to
providing preventive and supportive services at the community or even neighborhood level using
Medicaid, TANF, and child welfare funding streams.
Conclusion
The time in ripe for such experimentation.  Every state is running a huge surplus in its TANF
budget.  The federal government is inviting experimentation in child welfare financing through
the Title IV-E waiver program.  But there is no guarantee that either of these situations will last.
Economic circumstances and shifting political winds could swiftly change things for the worse.
To put it bluntly, collaboration between the workfare and child welfare systems is most likely to
happen and to be fruitful in the context of innovation and fiscal largess.  Let’s not wait for the
predicted “race to the bottom” in the administration of welfare reform before we get the two
systems working in sync.  Perhaps we were wrong back in the 1960s when we separated basic
economic assistance from other services to families.  We are certainly wrong in doing so now.
